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Abstract 
In the past few years, there has been a surge in lawsuits against the mechanism for resolving 
international investment disputes through the Investors State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) forum 
proposed by foreign investors who are host states, including Indonesia. Most of the claims are 
due to policies of the host country which are intended to protect the basic rights of the people 
such as the right to health, the right to a healthy environment, taxes, as well as the minimum 
standard of wages for workers. This policy provides a loss for foreign investors and is considered 
as a violation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). BIT is often recognized to be detrimental 
to Indonesia, because it potentially can disrupt the sovereignty of the country, especially when it 
is dealing with foreign investors disputes. By using a comparative juridical approach as a research 
method, this article tries to provide sufficient rules for new BIT model by comparing with Brazil. 
Brazil’s Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) has succeeded in reforming 
Brazil investment regime (specifically on its BITs). Indonesia therefore needs to change several 
provisions in its BITs as also provided in CIFA Brazil, which is not member of the ICSID Convention. 
Keywords : BIT, CIFA, Investor State Dispute Settlement, ICSID 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Baru di Indonesia: Perbandingan dengan Brazil 
Abstrak 
Beberapa tahun terakhir, ada lonjakan tuntutan hukum terhadap mekanisme penyelesaian 
sengketa investasi internasional melalui  Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), sebuah forum 
yang diusulkan oleh investor asing yang menjadi negara tuan rumah    termasuk Indonesia. 
Sebagian besar tuntutan disebabkan oleh kebijakan negara tuan rumah yang bertujuan untuk 
melindungi hak-hak dasar masyarakatnya seperti hak atas kesehatan, hak atas lingkungan yang 
sehat, pajak, juga standar minimum upah pekerja. Kebijakan ini berdampak pada kerugian bagi 
investor asing dan dianggap sebagai pelanggaran Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). BIT 
seringkali dianggap merugikan bagi Indonesia, karena dapat mengganggu kedaulatan negara, 
khususnya ketika berhadapan dengan sengketa internasional dengan investor asing. Dengan 
menggunakan pendekatan yuridis normatif dan metode perbandingan, artikel ini mencoba 
untuk memberikan aturan hukum yang memadai untuk model BIT yang baru dengan melakukan 
perbandingan dengan BIT Brazilia yang disebut Cooperation and Investment Facilitation 
Agreement (CIFA). Brazil dipilih karena merupakan negara yang berhasil melakukan reformasi 
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terhadap rezim investasinya, khususnya pada BIT. Hasil dari perbandingan tersebut adalah 
Indonesia perlu merubah beberapa ketentuan dalam BITs nya, seperti yang terkadung dalam 
CIFA di Brazil, yang bukan merupakan negara anggota dari Konvensi ICSID. 
Kata Kunci: BIT, CIFA, Penyelesaian Sengketa Investor-Negara, ICSID 
A. Introduction 
International relations that occur among 
subjects of international law, both between 
countries or between countries and other 
subjects of international law do not always 
run well. Various legal systems and 
government system often lead to the 
differences of the opinion and views among 
countries and cause an international 
disputes between them.1 The definition of 
international disputes is not yet universally 
agreed and it is debated whether the 
definition are similar with international 
conflict.2 In general, international legal 
disputes means a dispute that can be solved 
based on international law.3 Limitation of 
the definition of international legal disputes 
is important since it sometime overlaps 
with political disputes. International 
Investment Arbitration is a procedure for 
solving disputes between foreign investors 
and host states (also called Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement or ISDS). The possibility 
for foreign investors to sue a host country is 
a guarantee for foreign investors who, in 
the case of disputes, will have access to an 
independent and quality arbitrator who will 
solve the dispute and make the award 
carried out. This allows foreign investors to 
bypass national jurisdictions that might be 
considered to be biased or lacking in 
independence, and to solve disputes in 
accordance with the different protections 
given under international agreements.4 
ICSID is an international investment 
arbitration body established by the World 
Bank with the intention of solving disputes 
especially regarding investment disputes 
among member countries. By all means, not 
                                                             
1  Corsin Bisaz, The Concept of Group Rights in International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 28. 
2           Ibid., p. 112. 
3   Ibid. 
4  Ibid. 
5  USA Global Investment Centre, Indonesian Investment and Business Guide, USA: USA International Publications, 2007, p. 4. 
6  Katharina Diel, Towards Consistency of International Investment Jurisprudence, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2017, p. 103. 
all the countries can resolve disputes in 
ICSID investment, unless the country has 
ratified the 1965 Washington Convention. 
Indonesia as one of the developing 
countries that is quite active in foreign 
investment has ratified this convention 
through Law No. 5 of 1968 concerning 
Settlement of Disputes between States and 
Foreign Citizens concerning Investment. 
In the Indonesian context, the 
regulation regarding foreign investment 
was regulated in Law No. 1 of 1967 
concerning Foreign Investment as amended 
by Law No. 11 of 1970 concerning 
Amendments and Additions to Law No. 1 of 
1967 concerning Foreign Investment and 
Law No. 6 of 1968 concerning Domestic 
Investment as amended by Law No. 12 of 
1970 concerning Amendments and 
Additions to  Law no. 6 of 1968 concerning 
Domestic Investment because the 
development of the era and the law were 
deemed to be no longer suitable with the 
need for accelerated development and the 
development of national law.5 Currently, 
the law was changed to Law No. 25 of 2007 
concerning Investment. The law brings 
together regulations regarding foreign 
investors and domestic investors. In other 
words, this Investment Law is intended to 
provide legal certainty between the 
investors and the host state. 6 
According to UNCTAD (1995), there are 
eight bilateral and multilateral agreements 
which usually apply to investments, namely 
Provisions on Capital Movement (PCM), 
Provisions on Foreign Borrowing (PFB), 
Double Taxation treaties (DTT), Insurances 
Guarantees in MIGA, Washington 
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Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (WCSID), Preferential 
Trade Agreement (PTA), and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BIT).7 In bilateral 
cooperation, countries establish 
relationships with reciprocity principal.8 In 
terms of investment, bilateral agreement 
institutions have been known since the 
decade of the 1970s in the framework of the 
International Guarantee Agreement (IGA).9 
In Indonesia, there have been around 66 
bilateral agreements which have been 
signed, but in the implementation, there 
are several obstacles which resulted as a 
dispute between Indonesia and other 
foreign countries.10 There are a number of 
cases which in reality the Indonesian 
government was sued by foreign investors 
due to the foreign investors' policies made 
by the Indonesian government to harm 
them.11 The investment protection by the 
International Investment Agreement (IIA) is 
carried out by Indonesia through the 
Investment Improvement and Protection 
Agreement (TIPI), where bilateral 
Investment Agreement (BIT) is one of 
them.12 Another form is the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), 
as well as the complete Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) containing Investor State Dispute 
Resolution (ISDS). Furthermore, to attract 
more investors, Indonesia also plans to join 
the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(Hasan, 2017). There are also other 
agreements such as the Agreement with 
Investment Conditions (TIP), Trade 
Relations Agreement (TRA), Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA), Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (TCA) and Cooperation 
                                                             
7  Rashmi Banga, Government Policies and 
Investment Agreements on FDI Inflows, India: 
Indian Council on International Economic Relations, 
2003, p. 100. 
8  Ibid. 
9  BKPM, Development of Investment and 
Improvement Agreements (P4M) and P4M 
Settlement Priorities Between Indonesia-Partner 
Countries, Jakarta: Report, 2013, p. 133. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ibid. 
Agreement (CA). It can be conveyed that the 
current government priority scale is to be 
approved or launched in negotiations and 
improvements of international economic 
cooperation given in the investment sector, 
such as: the Indonesia-EU Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU-
CEPA); Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (IA-CEPA); Indonesia-
Europe Free Trade Association (IEFTA-
CEPA); and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP); ASEAN-Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement (AJEPA) and 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP).13 The government 
believes this can provide a significant 
attraction for foreign investors to come to 
Indonesia. 
BIT is one of the most commonly used 
investment agreement forms of IIA by 
Indonesia. Theoretically, BIT must be able to 
benefit both parties, based on the principle 
of reciprocity, equality and non-
intervention in international law. However, 
in practice the existence of BIT is much 
complained by developing countries 
including Indonesia. First, the substance of 
the majority of BITs is imbalance. Almost all 
articles in the BIT contain enormous 
protection and rights for foreign investors; 
on the contrary there are so many 
obligations for the host country. There is no 
protection and rights for the host. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the IIT has reduced 
the principle of equality in international 
law, because the host country does not 
enjoy the actual benefits of the agreement. 
Second obligation, BIT eliminates the 
sovereignty of the state to adopt policies 
13  In August 2012, the 16 Economic Ministers 
endorsed the Guiding Principles and Objectives for 
Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. The RCEP negotiations were launched 
by Leaders from 10 ASEAN Member States (Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Viet Nam) and six ASEAN FTA partners 
(Australia, People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, and New Zealand) during the 
21st ASEAN Summit and Related Summits in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia in November 2012. 
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that protect the public interest. The host 
country will be prosecuted before the 
Investor-State Dispute Resolution (ISDS) 
when policies to protect public interests are 
considered inconsistent with commitments 
in international investment agreements and 
harm foreign investors. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that there are 
many parties who question the urgency of 
the use of BIT and even recommend the 
government to end the agreement. Doubts 
about the need for BITs are reinforced by 
the fact that in recent years the number of 
lawsuits using BIT as a legal basis has 
increased significantly. The Indonesian 
government realizes that BIT is still 
important to attract foreign investors. 
However, a review of existing BITs is needed 
because of both the substance and the 
structures are very diverse, inconsistent, 
containing such open clauses, which tend to 
be very dangerous for Indonesia.14 
According to BKPM, many BITs are no 
longer relevant, therefore they need to be 
revised, according to the conditions and 
interests of the country. This is 
understandable considering that most BITs 
are made when Indonesia still needs 
investment to pursue economic growth. In 
fact, Indonesia is not the only country that 
has ended or reviewed its BIT because other 
countries have experienced the same 
problem. Reforms in other countries can be 
used as a reference for Indonesia to develop 
its new BIT model that provides a balance 
between the interests of foreign investors 
and the interests of Indonesia as the host 
country. 
This article will further explain about 
the need of Indonesia to reform the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty with the foreign 
investors by comparing the Cooperation 
and Investment Facilitation Agreement in 
                                                             
14  Yannick Radi, “Realizing Human Rights in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from 
Within the International Investment Law Toolbox”, 
North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation, 2012, Vol. 3, Issue.1, p. 
1107-1119 
Brazil. The discussion will be split into 5 
parts. The first part is the background to 
explain the reason why the topic was 
chosen. The Jurisdiction of ICSID and its 
relation with BIT will be discussed in the 2nd 
part. The related case with BIT reform will 
be explained and introduced in the 3rd part. 
The 4th part will discuss about CIFA as the 
BIT and international investment regime 
reform in Brazil. The 5th is conclusion.  
B. The Jurisdiction of ICSID and its Relation 
with BIT 
The 1965 Washington Convention regarding 
Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Dispute between States and 
Nationals of other States, also called World 
Bank Convention, was signed in Washington 
DC on March 18, 1965. The Headquarter is 
based on Washington and affiliated with 
the World Bank. The purpose of the 
establishment of this convention is to 
protect foreign investors from unilateral 
actions by host states, which have the 
potential to create disputes because the 
actions conducted without consent from 
both parties. This dispute can even develop 
into conflict or war. Unilateral actions of the 
recipient of capital which are usually 
developing countries are acts of 
nationalization or expropriation. One of the 
cases that led to the formation of this 
convention was the act of nationalization of 
French companies in Tunisia in 1964.15 
The two main objectives of the 
establishment of this convention, are to 
build the first bridge to fill the vacuum of 
legal efforts in resolving investment cases 
by providing a special mechanism in the 
form of arbitration or conciliation facilities. 
Second, to encourage and protect capital 
flows from developed countries to 
developing countries. Indonesia has ratified 
15  Matthew C. Porterfield, “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Come?”, Yale Journal of 
International Law Online, Vol. 41, Issue 1, 2015, p.1-
12. 
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this convention through Law No. 5 of 1968, 
concerning Ratification of the Convention 
concerning the Settlement of Disputes 
between Countries and Foreigners 
concerning Investment. The jurisdiction of 
the ICSID is regulated in Article 25 of the 
Washington Convention 1965, specifically 
paragraph (1), governing the following: 
“The Jurisdiction of the Centre shall 
extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a 
contracting state (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a contracting 
state designated to the centre by that 
state) and a national of another 
contracting state, which the parties to 
the dispute consent in writing to submit 
to the centre. When the parties have 
given their consent, no party may 
withdraw its content unilaterally.” 
Regarding the jurisdiction of the ICSID, 
Article 25 also stipulates that at any time 
the State may submit an exception not to 
include certain disputes with the ICSID. This 
is regulated in Article 25 paragraph 4, which 
contains the following:16 
“Any contracting state, at the time of 
ratification, acceptance or approval of any 
time, which would not be considered 
submitting the jurisdiction of the center. 
The Secretary General shall forthwith 
transmitting such notification to all 
contracting states. Such notification is 
required by paragraph (1).” 
However, the provisions of this article 
are limited by the previous articles in order 
to achieve the purpose of the convention. 
This exception is made by notifying the 
ICSID. BIT is one of the sources of law in the 
field of international economic law. Initially 
the State's economic activities or 
investment began with the establishment of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
                                                             
16  Rashmi Banga, Loc.Cit. 
17  Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International 
Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, p. 180. 
(FCN) agreement between countries.17 
However, since the 1960s the existence of 
the FCN has been replaced by the existence 
of BIT. This agreement was initially initiated 
by European countries which saw the need 
for investment arrangements in a country. 
The following are the basic rules contained 
in BIT, including the Principles of Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, National Treatment, 
Most Favored Nation Treatment (MFN), and 
a combination of National Treatment and 
MFN.18 BIT becomes the basis of a claim by 
a country to another country in the ICSID. 
For example, in the case of Churchill who 
sued Indonesia in an ICSID based on BIT 
between Indonesia and the United 
Kingdom. Therefore, looking at the purpose 
of the ICSID, it is a possibility that several 
BITs involving Indonesia contained a 
dispute resolution clause referring to the 
Agency ICSID Arbitration. This is of course 
supported by the advantages possessed by 
ICSID as one of the international 
commercial arbitration bodies. Broche 
divides the arbitration jurisdiction regulated 
in the BIT as follows:19 
The BIT clause only states that 
based on the agreement of the 
parties, the dispute arising will 
be resolved through an 
arbitration institution; 
1. The second clause requires "... 
a conciliation or arbitration by 
the Center ..." sympathetic 
consideration but does not 
require an agreement from the 
parties. 
2. The third type of clause, which 
requires the recipient country 
"... to be assent to any demand 
on the part of the nation to 
submit for conciliation or 
arbitration any dispute arising 
from the investment" and; 
18  Dilip K. Das, Regionalism in Global Trade, 
Chaltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004, p. 96. 
19  Hinrich Voss, The Determinants of Chinese Outward 
Direct Investment, Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2011, p. 45. 
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3. The fourth type of clause, that 
is, the clause that gives 
authority from ICSID as a media 
for dispute resolution if a 
dispute arises between the 
parties in the future. This type 
is usually found in BITs made by 
the British Government. 
Awareness of the efficiencies in 
resolving disputes between investors with 
host country also occur because of the 
temporary nature of arbitration courts (ad 
hoc), lack of transparency and legitimacy. 
Problems arise because of jurisprudence in 
this court is very diverse and there is no 
appeal process thus reducing the standard 
of truth and legal consistency. Although 
BITs are claimed to be reciprocal 
agreements between parties bound in it, in 
fact, the BITs agreement is not symmetrical. 
BITs look equal because it regulates that 
citizens and companies of each country 
which can invest in each other's regions 
with equal protection.20 Even so, most 
signed BITs are between developed 
countries and developing countries. 
Imbalance is created between the two with 
their relative bargaining position of each 
country and the direction of capital 
transfers. Usually, industrial countries 
become a source of investment while 
developing countries become recipients. 
C. The Need of Indonesia for New Model of 
BIT 
Indonesia has shown dissatisfaction with 
the current situation of investment 
agreements, and expressed reluctance to 
ISDS. Earlier this year, the Dutch embassy in 
Jakarta announced that the Indonesian 
Government had told the Netherlands that 
they intended to end the Dutch-Indonesian 
BIT, starting July 1, 2015, when the BIT 
ended. The Dutch embassy also stated that 
                                                             
20  Dilip K. Das, Loc.Cit. 
21  Steffen Hindelang and Markus Krajewski, Shifting 
Paradigms in International Investment Law: More 
Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly Diversified, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 328. 
the Indonesian Government had said it 
would terminate 67 BITs.21 
Since then, there has been extensive 
discussion about the intentions of the 
Indonesian Government and what might 
motivate his decision to cancel the Dutch 
BIT. It has been suggested that, at least in 
part, the case of Churchill Mining PLC and 
Planet Mining Pty Ltd v. Republic of 
Indonesia may have motivated the 
Government of Indonesia to review the 
current portfolio of agreements. Churchill's 
claim, which has raised concerns in 
Indonesia, is worth more than $ 1 billion, 
not including interest.22 Indeed, there is a 
firm call for Indonesia to immediately 
withdraw from the ICSID and continue to 
treat BIT carefully. This reason for caution 
includes the need to treat foreign and 
domestic investors equally and to restrain 
the Government as a result of international 
claims filed against them. More specifically, 
there is a view that, given its current 
economic strength, Indonesia no longer 
needs to abandon its autonomous 
arrangements to attract foreign 
investment.23 
The termination of its BIT by Indonesia 
does not mean the full withdrawal of all 
obligations and investment protection 
mechanisms.24 Existing investors will 
continue to be protected by "survival 
clauses" that have been included in many 
BITs. For example, under the Dutch-
Indonesian BIT, investment under BIT will 
be protected by a 15-year sunset period 
after the termination of BIT. Furthermore, 
even if all the BITs are terminated, 
Indonesia will still be subject to its 
obligations under the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement and 
22  UNCTAD, “Reform of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap”, Issues Note 
No. 2, June 2013, p.1. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid, p. 2. 
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the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement.25 
As a result, it seems that Indonesia's 
response (especially in the case of Churchill 
and Planet, and generally its determination 
to overturn the Netherlands BIT and review 
others) is more a reaction to the BIT 
provisions in practice and its application 
than in principle. Investor protection, this 
position is supported by President 
Yudhoyono's statement after the decision 
of Churchill's jurisdiction, when he railed 
against greed and "looting foreign 
companies", and did not conflict with the 
reasonable rights of investors.26 Whatever 
might be the real catalyst for notices of 
cancellation and review, it seems clear that 
Indonesia's actions have been driven by a 
number of related factors, including 
concerns about what it considers as 
increasing exposure to investor claims in 
international arbitration, national 
legislation and overriding domestic justice is 
considered a reckless claim, and IIA is 
obsolete.  
As Anthony Crockett pointed out, most 
Indonesian BITs were signed before the so-
called "new generation" of BITs (as 
exemplified by the 2004 US BIT Model) and 
as such would be seen as representatives of 
"old generation BITs" and lack of officers 
(such as those shown from an Indonesian 
perspective by the results of the Planet 
jurisdiction case.27 The Ambassador also 
stated that a consistent template is needed 
to guide the Indonesian BIT negotiators. The 
Indonesian government has also explained 
that its review is intended to lead to the 
development of the BIT Model. This raises 
the problem of the approach or policy 
direction that might be taken by Indonesia 
                                                             
25  James Headley, A. Reitzig, and J. Burton, Public 
Participation in Foreign Policy, London: Palgrave 
Macmilan, 2012, p. 51. 
26  Julien Chaisse and Tsai-yu Lin, International 
Economic Law and Governance: Essays in Honour of 
Mitsuo Matsushita, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016, p. 157. 
27  Pasha L. Hsieh and Bryan Mercurio, ASEAN Law in 
the New Regional Economic Order: Global Trends 
in relation to this BIT Model, as well as the 
inclusion of BIT and ISDS provisions in wider 
trade agreements. Losari and Ewing-Chow 
suggest that, procedurally, there are three 
options for Indonesia to stop existing BITs, 
namely:28 
1. Terminating BIT which passes 
unilaterally by means of notification 
(as happened with the Dutch-
Indonesian BIT) and renegotiates 
new ones; 
2. Terminating the old BIT 
consensually with another party (as 
it seems to happen with the 
Singapore-Indonesia BIT) and 
renegotiate a replacement 
agreement; or 
3. Old BIT renegotiations with a view 
to changing clauses to clarify them 
further. 
The problem with the first option is 
that investments made before the 
termination date still enjoy protection for 
the next period (usually fifteen years) in 
accordance with the provisions in the 
survival clause.29 The second and third 
options can allow for direct conclusions 
from the previous provisions, including the 
provisions of the survival clause, on mutual 
agreement and formalization between the 
two parties from a replacement agreement 
or amended clause. However, as Losari and 
Ewing-Chow show, the second and third 
options can really be taken only if Indonesia 
already has its BIT Model.30 At the same 
time, their success is entirely dependent on 
the consent of others to give the proposal 
to Indonesia.  
and Shifting Paradigm, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019, p. 277. 
28  Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, and Jorge E. 
Viñuales, The Foundations of International 
Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 469. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Chester Brown, Commentaries on Selected Model 
Investment Treaties, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013, p. 543. 
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D. CIFA: The Brazil’s New Model of BIT 
Brazil's experience with investment 
agreements is in stark contrast to other 
countries. When most states promoted it, 
Brazil refused to do so. For this reason, the 
promotion of government Cooperation and 
Investment Facilitation (CIFA) has recently 
been interesting agreement for the 
investment climate in Brazil.31 In 1991, 
Brazil started one of the largest 
privatization programs in the world, selling 
assets worth more than US $ 100 billion. 
Seventeen years later and with the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) which ranks tenth 
in the world, Brazil is an industrial power 
which, according to the World Bank, 
experiences stable economic growth, a fact 
that has been partly facilitated by Brazil to 
increase the implementation of openness 
principal for the investment regime. In 
January 2006, Brazil realized about US $ 88 
billion in sales revenue and around US $ 18 
billion in debt transfers as a result of the 
privatization program. Foreign investment 
accounts for around 48% of that total. 
Regardless of the importance of foreign 
investment in the economy and unlike 
other South American countries, Brazil is 
not a party to the bilateral investment 
agreement (BIT) and has not ratified the 
ICSID Convention.32 One reason for Brazil's 
reluctance to commit itself to such an 
agreement is legal uncertainty. In 
particular, there is controversy in Brazil with 
regard to whether ratification of such 
agreement is prohibited under Brazilian law 
on the grounds that it impedes the 
sovereign rights of the state. However, 
others noted that Brazil could legally, and in 
fact had previously agreed to bind foreign 
arbitration by routinely entering into 
contracts that provided the dispute 
                                                             
31   Anthea Roberts, et.al (eds.), Comparative 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018, p. 123. 
32  Geraldo Vidigal, “Brazil’s New Model of Dispute 
Settlement for Investment: Return to the Past or 
Alternative for the Future?”, Journal of World 
Investment and Trade, Vol. 19, Issue 3, 2018, p. 477. 
33  Ibid. 
resolution mechanism. Different with the 
majority of its neighboring countries in Latin 
America, Brazil has never ratified 
international investment agreements 
containing the ISDS clause (between 1994 
and 1999, the country signed a total of 14 
BITs, but never ratified them) and never 
adopted the ICSID Convention.33 Provisions 
for resolving disputes in two bilateral 
agreements on applicable investments, 
both of which were signed before the 
agreement between Germany and Pakistan 
which formalized the ISDS, were of an inter-
country nature and were not mandatory. 
There are two reasons for Brazil not to 
comply with an investment regime 
dominated by ISDS.34 First, there are several 
doubts regarding the constitutional barriers 
to the Brazilian state's submission to 
investment arbitration. Second, the state is 
able to maintain its appeal to invest in a way 
that does not tie it to the ISDS. Indeed, 
Brazil is consistently ranked among the top 
10 recipients of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) worldwide. Even in the 2014 and 2015 
crisis years, Brazil ranked 4th in the world 
among FDI recipients. At least for countries 
with Brazilian characteristics, it appears 
that IIA is not decisive for attracting FDI. 
Brazil's absence from the international 
investment law regime does not mean that 
foreign investors are not protected in this 
country.35 Especially since the enactment of 
the arbitration law in 1996, contractual 
arbitration has increasingly been used as a 
means of resolving disputes in state 
contracts. A number of decisions by the 
Brazilian high court have confirmed the 
legality of the arbitration clause in the state 
contract and the enforcement of the 
arbitration award against the state. 
However, regarding the international 
34  See Maria A Gwynn, “South American Countries’ 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Structuralist 
Perspective”, JIDS, Vol.  6, Issue 1, 2015, p. 101–
102. 
35  Thomas Schultz and Cédric Dupont, “Investment 
Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-
Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical 
Study”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
25, Issue 4, 2014, p. 1147 and 1151. 
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investment regime, Brazil's position 
remains an attentive observer. Moreover, 
in 2015, Brazil signed six CIFAs with 
Mozambique, Angola, Malawi, Mexico, 
Colombia and Chile.36 And in 2016, Brazil 
signed a broader agreement with Peru in 
the framework of 'Economic and Trade 
Expansion Agreement' - which regulated 
the same provisions relating to 
investment.37 Brazil has stated that it is 
intended to create incentives for mutual 
investment through a mechanism of 
intergovernmental dialogue for investors 
and the state to provide an alternative 
institutional model for the prevention and 
resolution of disputes. 
Overcoming traditional Brazilian 
resistance to the IIA, CIFA created a new 
regime for FDI protection, not including the 
ISDS and instead established a hybrid 
system of dispute prevention and 
arbitration mechanisms between countries. 
CIFA establishes a legal framework for the 
governments of countries of origin to 
defend the interests of citizens, negotiate 
directly with, or initiate arbitrary 
proceedings against, the host country 
government. Arbitration is compliance only 
rather than compensating investors for 
violations.38 
There are two elements consisted in 
Brazil’s ISDS in CIFA, such as:39 
1. Dispute Prevention (Focal 
Points and Joint Committee) 
A number of CIFA provisions 
relate to the prevention of 
disputes, which aim to avoid other 
avenues to litigation. For this 
purpose, one 'focal point or 
ombudsman' for each party and 
                                                             
36  Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in 
International Investment Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 56. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Frank J Garcia (et.al), “Reforming the International 
Investment Regime: Lessons from International 
Trade Law”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
Vol. 18, Issue 4, 2015, p. 861 and 874. 
another one is Joint Committee. 
Focal Points are domestic 
government institutions of the 
parties, while the Joint Committee 
is the organ of agreement for 
political decision making, and is 
responsible for managing collective 
agreements and is responsible for 
managing relevant agreements.40 
Focal Points are government 
instruments that must be 
implemented to ensure the proper 
implementation of CIFA, which 
serves as the first contact point for 
foreign investors in the host 
country. The creation of the CIFA 
focal point was inspired by South 
Korea's positive experience with 
the investment ombudsman. The 
Office of the South Korean Foreign 
Investment Ombudsman (OFIO) 
provides post-investment services 
for foreign investors and issues 
regarding finance, taxation, 
accounting, intellectual property 
rights, construction issues and labor 
or employee’ issue.41 
If the works of Focal Points are 
not successful, CIFA also requires 
that the question that is of interest 
to investors is before the start of 
the dispute. The Joint Committee 
must examine disputes; hear 
parties, as well as investors and 
governments and non-government 
entities involved in disputes; and 
issuing public reports, which 
include the Joint Committee, also 
seen in other international 
agreements, 60 playing an 
important institutional role in CIFA. 
39  Michael Waibel (et.al), The Backlash Against 
Investment Arbitration. Perceptions and Reality, 
The Hague: Kluwer, 2010, p. 77. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Thomas W Wälde, “Improving the Mechanisms for 
Treaty Negotiation and Investment Disputes: 
Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and 
Legitimacy” in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy 2008–2009, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 505, 543. 
101 
 
 
 
Resha Rosana Putri 
Indonesia’s New Model of Bilateral Investment Treaty: Comparison with Brazil 
 
They provide ways to resolve 
potential conflicts without going 
into litigation. The big role of the 
Joint Committee and Focal point is 
the perspective underlying CIFA: 
providing institutions and 
instruments for cooperation 
between countries, bringing 
elements of diplomacy to the 
investment protection regime. 
2. Dispute Settlement 
The Brazil-Angola CIFA 
stipulates that, if a dispute cannot 
be resolved through negotiations or 
with a recommendation from the 
Joint Committee, the parties may 
request assistance from the state-
to-state arbitration mechanism, 
which means that arbitration will 
require a new agreement between 
the two parties. Under the CIFA 
Brazil-Mozambique and Brazil-
Malawi, disputes that are not 
resolved by agreement can be 
submitted to arbitration 'whenever 
deemed comfortable by the 
parties'.42 This agreement refers to 
the state-to-state arbitration 
mechanism 'to be formed by the 
Joint Committee'. Although the 
words in the provision do not 
appear to preclude the 
establishment of a further 
mechanism in which arbitration is 
compulsory, this seems to require a 
new agreement between the 
parties. In contrast, the CIFA 
American Latin American feature 'is 
a dispute settlement provision that 
used to be and forms a two-stage 
process. In the first stage, the Joint 
Committee must be officially 
arrested with a dispute; given a 
                                                             
42  See Charles N Brower and Sarah Melikian, “We 
Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us! Is the 
Industrialized North Going South on Investor-State 
Arbitration?”, 2015, p. 19; Catherine M Amirfar, 
“Treaty Arbitration: Is The Playing Field Level and 
Who Decides Whether It Is Anyway?” in Albert Jan 
van den Berg (ed), Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, 
period of 60 days to issue a report 
on the matter. If this does not 
resolve the dispute, one party may 
unilaterally request an arbitration, 
carried out (in the absence of an 
agreement between the parties to 
bring disputes to the institutional 
mechanism) before the ad hoc 
arbitration court. Importantly, a 
backward mechanism is available to 
prevent parties from thwarting 
dispute resolution procedures by 
failing to appoint arbitrators. If the 
parties fail to appoint members to 
the court or if the arbitrator 
appointed by the party fails to 
jointly appoint a seat within the 
specified deadline, this 
appointment must be carried out 
by an international institution. The 
established CIFA mandatory 
arbitration mechanism seems to 
refer to the language of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU). Article 3 of Annex I of the 
Brazil-Chile CIFA, which sets out the 
reference provisions for arbitration 
courts, describes them as:43 
“To examine, methods and 
objective agreements are 
made from requests to 
form an arbitral tribunal, 
and to make facts and legal 
findings, or not the actions 
referred to in accordance 
with the Agreement.” 
This language echoes Article 7.1 of 
the DSU, which is set as the 
standard reference frame for WTO 
panels, a problem referred to by the 
WTO adjudication. Article 11 The 
DSU adds that the panel must make 
an objective assessment of the 
Challenges, The Hague: Law International, 2015, p. 
755–775. 
43  Karl Sauvant and Federico Ortino, Improving the 
International Investment Law and Policy Regimes: 
Options for the Future, Finland: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Finland, 2013, p. 44. 
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problem before that, including an 
objective assessment of the facts 
and conditions of compliance with 
the relevant closed agreement. 
Finally, Article 12.7 of The DSU 
stipulates that the panel report 
must describe the findings of the 
facts, the findings of the relevant 
provisions and basic 
recommendations, and the 
recommendations that make 
them.44 
Apart from the language taken 
from the text, CIFA shared with the 
WTO, the purpose of 
communication, stated in Article 
3.7 of the DSU, CIFA of Brazil-
Mexico and Brazil-Peru stated this 
goal explicitly, while CIFA Brazil-
Chile and Brazil-Colombia used 
words that slightly different, 
provided that the purpose of 
arbitration is to provide 
compensation:45 
“The purpose of the arbitration 
is to approve it with an 
arbitration award so as not to 
comply. The parties may not 
agree that the arbitrator 
considers the existence of 
damage and stipulates in the 
award of compensation for this 
damage. If the award 
determines monetary 
compensation, the party 
receiving this compensation 
must transfer it to reduce 
litigation costs, following each 
party's domestic procedures. 
The difference between these 
two is different and, apparently, 
alternative solutions are available 
after the discovery of violations.46 
                                                             
44  Anthea Roberts, et.al (eds.), Op.Cit, p. 12. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Daniel M C Barbosa and Pedro Martini, “Two Sides 
of the Same Coin: To What Extent Is Arbitration 
with the Brazilian Administration Similar to 
Investment-Treaty Arbitration?” in Daniel de 
Andrade Levy, et.al (eds.), Investment Protection in 
One of them is a formal statement 
about the obligation to adjust to 
the agreement, an action that is 
considered inconsistent. Requires 
compensation payments for 
damage.47 The same results arise 
from the provisions in the Brazil-
Colombia CI preventing the 
arbitration court from awarding 
compensation for damage unless 
the parties sign a special agreement 
for this effect. If the compliance 
obligation in the CIFA is interpreted 
as equivalent in the WTO law, the 
decision that finds the violation will 
only require the obligation for the 
offender to adjust and stop the 
behavior of CIFA which is 
inconsistent with the prospective 
effect. The country found in the 
violation will be able to fully comply 
with the decision by revoking the 
relevant action ex nunc (in case of a 
non-policy violation but an action, 
he cannot repeat the action). The 
legal situation and transfer of 
property generated by these 
actions will be fully maintained.48 
This interpretation will produce 
three effects. First, it would 
overturn a number of substantive 
provisions in the CIFA, making 
takeovers without de facto 
compensation permitted when 
carried out through one-time 
actions whose effects could later be 
considered to be crystallized in the 
past. Secondly, it can produce a 
perverse incentive for the 
government that seeks to extract 
leases from foreign investors: while 
actions aimed at extracting leases 
from time to time (for example, 
Brazil, Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer Law and 
Business, 2013, p.  37–59 
47  Ibid.  
48  Folla Adeleke, International Investment Law and 
Policy in Africa: Exploring a Human Rights Based 
Approach to Investment Regulation and Dispute 
Settlement, London: Roudledge, 2017, p. 47. 
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higher taxes) are subject to CIFA 
repairs, one-time collection will be 
protected from drugs. Third, this 
interpretation will make CIFA 
arbitration unattractive compared 
to other forms of investment 
protection. 
Competition from other forms 
of dispute resolution is very 
significant. If the CIFA court is only 
empowered to provide limited 
compensation and different 
international courts have 
jurisdiction over disputes (which is 
the case for ICJ between some 
CIFA),49 investors might find it more 
interesting to convince their home 
countries to take disputes with 
adjudicators where they can get 
effective recovery - compensation 
or retrospective restitution - rather 
than CIFA arbitration. Or, investors 
can choose to ensure they are more 
effectively protected by contract 
arbitration. Confidentiality of 
contract arbitration will usually 
mean that arbitration courts can 
still be established and provide 
compensation, without 
transparency which usually 
accompanies arbitration between 
countries, and which is increasingly 
needed in investor-state 
arbitration.50 
The provisions in CIFA Brazil-
Mexico and Brazil-Colombia which 
require the consent of the parties 
to give the compensation do not 
affect the task of reparation, which 
arises only because of the fact of 
the violation.51 On the contrary, this 
                                                             
49  Makane Moïse Mbengue and Stefanie Schacherer, 
Foreign Investment under the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
Switzerland: Springer, 2019, p. 259. 
50  See Fabio Morosini and Michelle Ratton Sanchez 
Badin, “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation 
and Facilitation of Investments: A New Formula for 
International Investment Agreements?”, 
Investment Treaty News, 2014, accessed from 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-
provision ensures the primacy in 
the practice of restoring 
compensation for compensation. 
While restitution has generally 
been affirmed by the court and the 
arbitral tribunal as the main remedy 
for violations, adjudicators often 
emphasize this in principle, only to 
conclude that restitution is 
impractical or unwanted and 
compensates. In arbitration that 
occurs under CIFA, only parties - 
namely the state party - can decide 
that compensation for restitution is 
undesirable and that compensation 
is the right compensation. In other 
cases, courts that decide to apply 
general international law can 
determine compensation to be 
paid, and even determine the 
amount.52 
Even in the absence of such 
strict provisions, some investment 
arbitrators have interpreted the 
advantages of restitution as means 
that compensation must be an 
additional drug. In Texaco v. Libya, 
the arbitral tribunal ordered Libya 
to return to the claimants of its oil 
operations, stating that restitution 
is 'normal sanctions for not carrying 
out contractual obligations ... 
cannot be applied only insofar as 
recovery of the status quo ante is 
impossible'. In Goetz v. Burundi, the 
ICSID arbitration court stated that 
Burundi could provide 'adequate 
and effective compensation' to the 
plaintiff, or that it could give them 
restitute in the integrum. In Arif v. 
Moldova, the ICSID arbitration 
brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-
facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-
international-investment-agreements/. 
51  Markus Krajewski and Rhea Tamara Hoffmann, 
Research Handbook on Foreign Direct Investment, 
Chaltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019, p. 576. 
52  Françoise Nicolas (et.al), “Lessons from Investment 
Policy Reform in Korea”, OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment 2013, Vol. 02, 2013, p. 24–
25. 
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court ordered Moldova, at 
Moldova's request, 'to allow the 
Applicant to open and operate 
duty-free shops at Chisinau 
International Airport without 
undue interference'.53 
CIFAs are not the only attempt 
to react to perceptions beyond the 
reach of the ISDS. In a shift marked 
by the signing and subsequent 
revisions of the US-South Korea 
FTA,54 the BIT and FTA increasingly 
determined that countries maintain 
extensive regulatory space and 
limit the possibility of investment 
claims. In addition, many IIAs 
contain chapters that limit the use 
of regulatory powers that are 
deemed undesirably, preventing 
the government from adopting lose 
labor standards and the 
environment to attract investment. 
In most cases, the provision is still 
insufficiently enforced and the 
accuracy of other more established 
obligations is found traditionally in 
IIA, although CPTPP, for example, 
provides the possibility of (state-to-
state) dispute resolution regarding 
this obligation.55 Overall, the idea 
that design IIA can be an important 
element in ensuring that 
investment functions to generate 
economic growth, and achieve 
socially desirable goals in other 
fields, has garnered support in 
capital exporting countries, which 
traditionally refuse to impose 
constraints on investor. 56   Thus, this 
increase in communication 
provides incentives and 
information needed for the 
government to file a claim to the 
                                                             
53  Ibid. 
54  Rubens Duarte, “The Role of Brazil in the 
Multilateral Financial System: An Analysis of 
Domestic and Structural Factors (2003-2015)”, The 
Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 
Vol. 11, Issue 3, 2017, p. 98.  
55  Ibid.  
court. Regarding Brazil, the WTO 
litigation led participation in the 
formation of important public-
private partnerships for dispute 
resolution, enabling it to challenge 
a number of steps before the WTO 
adjudicators, the most significant in 
the field of subsidies. Other CIFAs 
are active in WTO dispute 
resolution as well, and this 
experience can prove important in 
preparing the resort for CIFA 
litigation to seek compensation for 
violations. 
 
E. The Need of Indonesia’s New Model of 
BIT 
Some Asian countries rethink the costs and 
benefits of BIT and take various policy 
measures to protect themselves from 
expensive investor-state arbitration.57 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia are currently 
reviewing their old BIT texts and are 
preparing a new template model for future 
agreements. India launched a review of 
investment agreements in mid-2012 after 
the announcement of a public release of 
arbitration served by more than a dozen 
foreign companies. This notification 
challenges various policies (and court 
decisions) and demands Billions of dollars in 
compensation for alleged violations of 
Indian BIT. The purpose of this review is to 
revise the 1993 Indian agreement text 
model and to provide a roadmap for 
renegotiating existing BITs. Similarly, 
Indonesia is currently reviewing the BIT and 
FTA investment chapters that have been 
previously signed.58 Indonesia believes the 
current IIA regime does not provide 
sufficient space for the sustainable 
development and revisions needed to 
renew existing IIAs to defend the right to 
56  Zoe Philips William, Rethinking Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, Netherlands: Both Ends, 2016, p. 29-30. 
57  See Christine Côté, “A Chilling Effect? The Impact of 
International Investment Agreements on National 
Regulatory Autonomy in the Areas of Health, Safety 
and the Environment”, PhD Thesis in London School 
of Economics and Political Science, London: 2014. 
58  Rubens Duarte, Loc.Cit. 
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declare their regulatory space and policies. 
One of Indonesia's biggest concerns about 
IIA is the provision of ISDS, which has 
increased Indonesia's exposure to investor 
claims in international arbitration. 
Indonesia's announcement to 
terminate more than 60 bilateral 
investment agreements (BIT) has triggered 
mixed reactions from academics and the 
business community around the world.  This 
termination can further be known in the 
termination of Indonesia-Netherlands BIT 
which was already explained above. There 
is speculation that this was a spontaneous 
reaction by the Indonesian government, 
which recently faced several state-investor 
arbitration cases.59 In fact, the 
announcement reminded us of the actions 
of several other governments that had 
stopped BIT or denounce the Investment 
Dispute Settlement Convention between 
States and other Citizens (ICSID Convention) 
to reduce their legal exposure to 
international claims before the arbitration 
tribunal. In contrast, statements from 
Indonesian government officials show that 
they are going through a review of the 
country's BIT by allowing the old ones to 
disappear so that new and better ones can 
be renegotiated. This is mainly because the 
old one was concluded when the 
investment policy landscape was very 
different. Therefore, reviewing Indonesia’s 
BIT will be timely. Existing clauses in 
Indonesia BIT is less clear and this has the 
potential to cause difficulties for the court 
in interpreting the provisions. It can also 
leave the court widely wisdom to interpret 
provisions, so as to make the state feel 
unjust bound by the 'imposed obligation' 
that they did not imagine when they were 
compile their IIA. The opportunity provided 
by the old BIT that has passed is also one 
that should be considered in depth about 
the need to provide policy space for the 
government, the importance of giving 
                                                             
59  Ibid. 
60  S. L. Magaira, Loc.Cit 
signals to foreign investors that Indonesia 
welcomes such investments, and the 
importance of protecting Indonesian 
investors when investing abroad.60 
It is not much different from that made 
by other countries; BIT Indonesia generally 
contains various protections for investors 
and obligations for the host. Some clauses 
that can be found in Indonesian BIT include 
Fair and Equitable treatment (FET) and 
adequate protection and security; MFN, 
national treatment; not take over; 
compensation for losses, investment 
transfers and free returns, as well as 
settlement disputes. 61Theoretically, this 
agreement is reciprocal that applies to both 
parties, but because Indonesia's role in 
general has always acted as the host, 
foreign investors seem to get more benefits 
from BIT.  Learning from BIT updated by 
many countries, there are some things that 
are recommended for Indonesia's BIT 
updates.  
First, there is a need to reformulate 
decisively the definition of investment and 
investors. This formulation is very 
important to limit who can send disputes to 
the State Dispute Resolution Forum (ISDS) 
and what type of investment is covered by 
BIT. For investors, it is necessary to 
formulate a number of things (including 
Host-State subsidiaries from other Party 
entities? Should the entity maintain a 
presence in the Host Country? Are there 
some registrations or approvals needed?). 
Related to the definition of investment, 
there must be several explanations 
regarding several things (portfolio 
investment, bonds, securities, sales of 
goods or services, other contractual rights, 
loans, intellectual property rights). In the 
case of Rafat Ali Rivzi v. The Government of 
Indonesia, Indonesia rejects ICSID 
jurisdiction, because article 2.1 of the 
Indonesia-UK BIT states that investment 
protection is only given to "British citizens 
61  Karen Mills, Investor State Arbitration: Case 
Studies-Indonesia. International Investment 
Arbitration Training, 2018, p. 12. 
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or companies ... who have been granted 
entry permits in accordance with Foreign 
Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or any law 
that changes or replaces it. " We could find 
any definition investment in other new 
model of BITs. In Brazil’s CIFA, the definition 
of investment plays an essential role, since 
the CIFAs cover only FDI, which is the kind 
of investment seen as able to play a more 
decisive role in the development of the 
states. Portfolio investments are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of the CIFAs, since 
they encompass essentially short-term and 
speculative investment.62 
Second, there is a need to reformulate 
the principles of Fair and Fair Treatment 
(FET). The majority of lawsuits filed by 
investors to ISDS use the argument that the 
host country has violated the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) standard.63 For 
example, in the case of Heslam, the plaintiff 
claimed that Indonesia violated the FET 
standard under the OIC Agreement. 
Furthermore, in the Rafat Ali case, 
Indonesia was prosecuted for violating 
Articles 4 and 2 (1) of the Indonesia-UK 
Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT) 
concerning FET. Churchill Mining Plc. also 
uses FET violations in its lawsuit against 
Indonesia in 2015. In general, many IIAs, 
including Indonesian BITs, do not provide 
definitions of what is meant by FET 
Standards, even if BIT provides definitions, 
only open language. This condition tends to 
be interpreted broadly before the ISDS 
forum, so that almost all state actions that 
harm investors can be considered as 
violations of this standard. Unfortunately, 
the Brazil’s CIFA does not contain this FET 
principle, but contain the corporate social 
responsibility.64 The national treatment 
                                                             
62  Riyatno, “Investment Dispute and International 
Arbitration”, Paper presented at seminar Indonesia 
and The Development of International Arbitration in 
BANI, Jakarta: 2017, p. 66. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Jason Webb Yackee, “Do States Bargain Over 
Investor-State Dispute settlement? Or Toward 
Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties”, Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2013, p. 277-
301. 
clause and the nation's most favored 
treatment (MFN) in CIFA stipulates that 
foreign investors must be treated no less 
favorably than domestic investors or 
investors from third parties. Some of the 
exceptions are maintained, such as the 
prohibition of investment in the border 
region. This model does not limit the steps 
of new public policies, if not discriminatory. 
There are also articles on transparency, 
freedom of transfer related to investment, 
and articles on expropriation, which 
determine that direct expropriation is not 
permitted, except if carried out in the public 
interest, in a non-discriminatory manner, in 
accordance with legal processes and 
effective compensation payments. An 
important innovation in relation to other 
investment agreement models is the 
introduction of clauses on corporate social 
responsibility based on the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
provisions on corruption and, in the latest 
negotiations, special exceptions for the 
protection of humans, animal and plant life. 
This is in line with Brazil's desire for 
investment to be socially responsible and 
contribute to sustainable development.65 
Third, there is a need for Indonesia’s New 
Model of BIT to prioritize the doctrine of 
solving local problems. The fatigue of the 
local solution doctrine gives investors’ 
access to the ISDS when local solutions are 
inadequate.66 The local recovery doctrine 
was found in BIT from 1970-1980s. After 
1980, this doctrine was not needed in BIT, 
and even many BITs strongly rejected this 
doctrine. An arbitration clause such as ICSID 
is interpreted as a rejection of the 
obligation of local recovery by parties in the 
65  Ibid. 
66  See World Bank,”Indonesia Continues Strong Pace 
of Reforms to Improve Business Climate: Doing 
business”, Press Release, 31 October 2017, 2018, 
accessed from 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2017/10/31/indonesia-continues-strong-
pace-of-reforms-to-improve-business-climate-
doing-business. 
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BIT. A small number of BITs still need local 
settlement obligations but with a time limit 
of around eighteen  months. Today, the 
doctrine of fatigue local solutions 
reappeared in the new BIT draft model 
released by India. A good example can be 
taken from the case of the Loewen Group v. 
the United States. In this case a Canadian 
funeral service operator (Raymond L. 
Loewen) claimed that his right to fair and 
equal treatment had been violated in the 
Mississippi Court, where he was ordered to 
pay hundreds of millions of dollars. The trial 
held under NAAA IIA rejected Loewen's 
claim because he had not submitted a claim 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. The benefits of 
applying fatigue to local solutions are to 
protect state sovereignty, as well as to help 
strengthen and integrate domestic and 
international systems for investor 
protection. 
Fourth, BIT needs to request written 
approval from both parties before the ISDS 
mechanism is implemented. This is in line 
with the principle that applies in arbitration 
law that the arbitration jurisdiction is based 
on mutual agreement. In the case of 
Warraq, investors are citizens of Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia does not have BIT with 
Saudi Arabia. Warraq brought the case to 
UNCITRAL based on the Agreement of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC) in 1981. Indonesia objected to the 
jurisdiction of UNCITRAL based on the same 
arguments used in the Rafat Ali case. 
Indonesia also believes that based on the 
OIC Agreement, the forum for investors is a 
local court. However, the Court ignored this 
argument and claimed to have jurisdiction. 
Learning from this case, it is important to 
establish provisions for written approval 
from both parties in the BIT.67 
Fifth, BIT needs to provide flexibility to 
the host country to protect the welfare of 
its people through non-discriminatory 
                                                             
67  BKPM, Loc. Cit. 
68  Consideration of Cooperation and Investment 
Facilitation Agreement. 
regulations for the purpose of public 
welfare, public health, safety, 
environmental friendliness, public morals 
or public order. CETA ensures investor 
protection, without ignoring the 
importance of protecting state sovereignty. 
This non-discriminatory provision has been 
also regulated in CIFA of Brazil. The 
Agreement contains a set of tools to 
mitigate investment risks and to avoid 
situations that may lead to formal disputes 
between the parties. Accordingly, the text 
lays downs guarantees of non-
discrimination, such as national treatment 
and most favored nation principles, 
transparency provisions, as well as specific 
conditions for direct expropriation, 
compensation in case of conflicts and the 
free transfer of funds.68 As for the 
negotiation process, given the horizontal 
and multidisciplinary aspects related to 
investments and the intention to reach an 
understanding with its partners, the 
Brazilian government considers important 
and desirable to establish a dialogue 
involving, as much as possible, the various 
competent governmental bodies.69 
F. Conclusion 
Some aspects IIAs are very sensitive in 
Indonesia and in other countries, both 
developed and developing countries. One 
of the most debated issues related to 
investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS). 
Articles on ISDS are included in most BITs 
and RTAs such as NAFTA, ACIA, and TPP. 
ISDS allows foreign investors to bypass their 
host's domestic court system and submit a 
complaint with an international arbitration 
court. This is seen as a loss of national 
sovereignty over problems that occur 
within national borders. The financial risk of 
such claims can also exceed US $ 1 billion. 
Because of these concerns, Indonesia has 
canceled many BITs for the past 2 years. But 
in what seems like a contradiction, 
Indonesia has performed a very similar 
69  Ibid. 
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obligation to approve the ISDS in ACIA and 
the ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA) with 
dialogue partners. Furthermore, President 
Joko Widodo has stated strongly interested 
in joining the TPP, which contains strong 
ISDS provisions. ASEAN Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) is also likely to include ISDS. 
Brazil is an interesting case because this 
country is not involved in specific BIT but 
still receives a large amount of foreign 
investment. The country signed 14 BITs in 
the 1990s, but the Indonesian National 
Congress Brazil refused to ratify them 
because of the potential risks associated 
with traditional ISDS systems. Lately, Brazil 
is reassessing its long-standing policy 
stance. In 2015, Brazil signed a Cooperation 
and Facilitation Investment Agreement 
(CIFA) with Mozambique, Angola, Colombia, 
Malawi and Mexico. This CIFA focuses 
primarily on investment cooperation and 
facilitation. By excluding state-investor 
arbitration, the CIFA promotes peaceful 
ways to resolve investment disputes. 
Martin Dietrich Brauch's paper provides an 
in-depth analysis of the CIFA of Brazil with 
Mozambique, Angola and Mexico. Given 
the growing criticism of the investor 
protection paradigm and weakness in 
investor state arbitration, Brauch explains 
how Brazilian CIFA is very different from the 
traditional BIT-ISDS regime. 
By taking a look with Brazil’s CIFA, we 
should conclude that the existence of the 
BITs is still important. However, Indonesia 
needs to update the BIT with new models 
that provide a balance between the 
interests of investors and the interests of 
the host country. Some Important changes 
recommended in the new BIT Indonesia 
model are as follows: 
1. Redefining unclear terms that open 
up opportunities for interpretation 
that harm Indonesia. The terms 
referred to include investment and 
foreign investors. 
2. Re-Formulation of Fair and Fair 
Treatment (FET) with clear 
standards. 
3. Requires written approval from 
both parties to bring the dispute to 
international arbitration. 
4. Providing flexibility to the state to 
protect public interests including 
human rights. 
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